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Abstract: Previous research has examined the impact of the law on decisions made about social sexual
interactions in the workplace in the context of a variety of individual difference variables including
gender of the observer and sexist attitudes, as well as situational factors including legal standard and prior
exposure to aggressive and submissive complainants. The current study continued this line of inquiry by
testing whether hostile or benevolent sexist attitudes behaved differently under manipulated exposure to
aggressive and submissive complainants. Full-time workers watched 1 videotape in which aggressive,
submissive, or neutral (i.e., businesslike) women complained that male coworkers sexually harassed
them; then, participants viewed a second complainant who always acted in a neutral behavioral tone. In
the first case, participants high in hostile sexism who took a reasonable person perspective (but not those
with a reasonable woman point of view) and all men who viewed an aggressive complainant found less
evidence of harassment. With the second set of allegations, female workers who were exposed to a
submissive complainant in the first case found less evidence of harassment against the neutral
complainant, suggesting that exposure to a submissive complainant triggered some type of victim
blaming in female workers. Policy and training implications are discussed.
Keywords: sexual harassment, aggressive and submissive complainants, ambivalent sexism

Some commentators argue that social scientists interested in understanding normative behavior in natural
environments, including social sexual interactions (Gutek, 1985; Wiener & Hurt, 1999) in the workplace,
could learn a great deal by describing the relationships between the law and the manner in which people
conduct their everyday lives (Melton, 1988, 1990; Melton & Saks, 1985; Wiener, 1990, 1993; Wiener &
Hurt, 1997, 1999, 2000; Wiener & Winter, 2007; Wiener, Winter, Rogers, & Arnot, 2004). A fruitful line
of research that has followed this prescription studies how workers evaluate sexual harassment complaints
by presenting to decision makers user-friendly descriptions of federal harassment law along with
instances of conduct, which may or may not rise to the level of misconduct prohibited by that law (Hurt,
Wiener, Russell, & Mannen, 1999; Maeder & Wiener, 2007; Wiener et al., 2002; Wiener & Hurt, 1997,
1999, 2000; Wiener, Hurt, Russell, Mannen, & Gasper, 1997; Wiener, Voss, Winter, & Arnot, 2005;
Wiener, Watts, Goldkamp, & Gasper, 1995; Wiener & Winter, 2007). This line of research assumes that
the greater impact of law occurs in the regulation of the workplace rather than in the resolution of disputes
that wind their way through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and ultimately end
up as jury trials. Although developing an understanding of how jurors make judgments of whether or not
an allegation is a violation of federal law is important in its own right, we believe that a broader impact of
law in the workplace concerns the way in which law influences workers’ perceptions of wrongdoing. The
workers’ evaluations of wrongfulness form the basis of their willingness to report violations and the basis
of organizational responses to possible violations. After all, exposure to possible workplace misconduct is
at the heart of every dispute, and the way in which workers react to that misconduct determines the way in
which the organization will deal with the potential wrongdoing.
This is not to suggest that research in this area can proceed without grounding in the law. To the contrary,
to understand fully the way in which harassment disputes arise from the workplace milieu, one must
begin with an understanding of how workers interact with settled law to evaluate the social sexual
conduct that they observe on the job. However, the law does not exist in the simple abstractions of black
letter doctrine. Researchers can only hope to understand the full impact of law by studying the context in

which the law shapes the situations that people face as they interact with one another in their everyday
lives. The courts are clearly ahead of social scientists in understanding this undeniable truth. As far back
as 1998, Justice Antonin Scalia declared that workplace context or, in the language of the law, the
“totality of the circumstances” was the final arbitrator in determining whether unwelcome social sexual
conduct constituted a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or was simply boorish behavior. He wrote,
“The real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding
circumstances, expectations, and relationships, which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the
words used or the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social
context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing…” and
actionable harassment (Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 1998 , p. 81).
However, this distinction is easier to describe than to find in the confusion of specific incidents at work.
In truth, hostile work environment sexual harassment claims are as diverse as the complainants who bring
them and the organizations in which they arise; because fact patterns vary extensively from allegation to
allegation, decision makers find it difficult to determine the threshold for discriminatory conduct. The
inconsistencies in the outcomes of the existing research literature on the attribution of responsibility in
sexual harassment claims point to the difficulties that individuals have when trying to draw a line between
behavior that is simply boorish and behavior that discriminates because of a worker’s sex. In this article,
we focus on situational differences in workers’ exposure to different types of female complainants and
individual differences in worker attitudes toward women to help explain how perceptions of hostile work
environment harassment rise out of the complexity of everyday social interaction. To understand the role
of these factors on perceptions of workplace misconduct, it is first necessary to understand where the law
leaves off and where observer discretion takes over.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (amended in 1991) prohibits an employer from discriminating
with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. Employers and their representatives may not subject workers, because of
their sex (Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 1993 ; Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 1986 ; and Rabidue v.
Osceola Refining Co., 1986 ), to unwelcome misconduct, which is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment” (Meritor, 1986 , p. 58;
see Clark County School District v. Breeden, 2001 ). Most courts determine whether unwelcome social
sexual conduct reaches the threshold of a hostile work environment with a reasonable person test, which
is “the perspective of a reasonable person’s reaction to a similar environment under essentially like or
similar circumstances” (Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 1986 , p. 620). However, others have used the
reasonable woman test to emphasize differences in how men and women view social sexual conduct.
Specifically, in Ellison v. Brady (1991) , the Ninth Circuit held that “a female plaintiff states a prima facie
case of hostile environment when she alleges conduct which a reasonable woman would consider
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment” (p. 879). In Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995) , the Ninth Circuit
clarified this standard holding that, “Whether the workplace is objectively hostile must be determined
from the perspective of a reasonable person with the same fundamental characteristics [as those of the
plaintiff]” (affirmed in Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 2000 ). Both the reasonable person and the
reasonable victim standards direct us to look to the totality of the circumstances to find the line that
separates discriminatory behavior from normal social sexual conduct at work. Using either standard, the

law tries to locate a line that demarcates unwelcome gender-based conduct, which is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to create a hostile work environment.
More recently, Justice Samuel Alito placed the nature of the legal standard more directly into play in
Supreme Court jurisprudence with his concurring opinion in Northern v. White (2006) in which he
questioned whether the reasonable person test should be completely objective (i.e., ignoring plaintiff
attributes) or more subjective, taking into consideration some of the complainants’ individual
characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race, and family relations). That is, he questioned whether the law
should use the point of view of an objective bystander or the perspective of the victim to assess the
severity and pervasiveness of unwelcome social sexual conduct at work. While lawyers and legislators
will undoubtedly continue to argue the philosophic and jurisprudential merits of these different
approaches, one way for psychologists to add to this debate is to study the differences that these standards
are likely to produce in evaluations of social sexual conduct at work. Do different standards have
implications for the perception of misconduct and the regulation of workplace conduct?
The intention of discrimination law is to rid the workplace of illegal discrimination. In fact, before a
worker can bring a Title VII case of discrimination to court, he or she must first make a complaint to the
EEOC, which can either issue a “right to sue letter” or not. Workers may bring cases without a right to
sue letter; however, the purpose of requiring workers to go first to the EEOC is to settle disputes without
going to trial. Indeed, very few cases actually go to trial because most complainants and employers settle
their conflicts outside of court. The importance of the type of standard used is at the center of the law’s
ability to deter illegal behavior. If the courts use a broader standard, one that prohibits more misconduct
(i.e., the reasonable victim as opposed to the reasonable person standard), then the law sends a message to
the workplace (through training and example) that prohibits a larger breadth of misconduct. It warns
against behavior that would be unwelcome and sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work
environment from the point of view of a complaining worker, not just the point of view of a reasonable
person. However, unless there are differences in how workers perceive social sexual behavior under these
different standards, then the importance of using different points of view is questionable. The purpose of
this line of research is to examine how different standards affect workers’ perceptions of what is and is
not sexual harassment (Hurt et al., 1999; Maeder & Wiener, 2007; Wiener & Hurt, 1997, 1999, 2000;
Wiener et al., 1995, 1997, 2002, 2005; Wiener & Winter, 2007).
In one study, Wiener and Hurt (2000) had full-time workers view video re-enactments of equal
employment opportunity officers interviewing workers involved in two harassment cases and asked them
to rate the conduct that the plaintiff complained about on several elements of sexual harassment law (e.g.,
unwelcomeness, severity, and pervasiveness). Wiener and Hurt also measured ambivalent sexism (that is,
hostile and benevolent sexism) in these full-time workers. Other research (e.g., Wiener et al., 2002;
Wiener & Hurt, 1999) demonstrated that these two attitude structures—hostile sexism (i.e., beliefs that
women are aggressive and must be kept in their place through gender dominance) and benevolent sexism
(i.e., beliefs that woman are weak and should be protected from overbearing men; Glicke & Fiske,
1996)—influence perceptions of hostile work environment harassment. Wiener & Hurt (2000) found that
participants who applied the reasonable person (as compared with the reasonable woman) legal standard
and those high (as opposed to low) in hostile sexism (Glicke & Fiske, 1996) found less evidence of sexual
harassment ( Wiener & Hurt, 2000). Notably, legal standard offset the effects of hostile sexism; across
both cases, the difference in harassment judgments between high and low hostile sexists disappeared

under the more specific reasonable woman standard but was pronounced in the more abstract reasonable
person condition. Others have also found stronger relative effects for hostile sexism as compared to
benevolent sexism on harassment judgments (O’Connor, Gutek, Stockdale, Geer, & Melancon, 2004;
Russell & Trigg, 2004). Nonetheless, the literature suggests that hostile attitudes toward women inhibit
harassment judgments and paternalistic attitudes sometimes facilitate them.
The main purpose of the current work was to extend the study of the effects of different standards on the
associations between hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, and judgments of sexual harassment that workers
make about workplace incidents. If workers are more likely to perceive identical conduct as harassing
under the reasonable victim as compared with the reasonable person standard, then there is a case that we
can make to courts and legislatures to use a more subjective approach. We wondered whether
manipulating the complainant’s behavioral tone by presenting an aggressive complainant or a submissive
complainant might trigger the same attitudes and effects on judgments of hostile work environment
harassment as prior research has found for hostile and benevolent sexism. That is, we asked whether
exposure to a hostile (submissive) complainant might trigger hostile (benevolent) sexism, influencing
judgments of harassment involving that complainant, and if such effects might even carry over to
subsequent female workers who complained about different instances with a different set of facts than in
the first scenario. We reasoned that if exposure to an aggressive (submissive) complainant triggers hostile
(benevolent) attitudes toward that complainant and other female complainants, then the moderating
effects of legal standard that offset sexist attitudes should have the same impact on the influence of
complainant behavioral tone (i.e., exposure to aggressive or submissive complainants).
It is worth noting that prior work has shown that research participants, especially men, sometimes
(Wiener et al., 1997; Wiener et al., 1995) but not always (Wiener et al., 2000, 2004) fail to recognize the
differences between the reasonable woman and reasonable person standards when they simply read or
view the language that constitutes the standard. The current research tested an approach to reinforce the
meaning of these standards by asking participants in the enhanced standard conditions to reflect on them
and describe what the reasonable person or woman perspectives meant before applying them. Participants
in the unenhanced standard conditions simply applied one of the rules after reading its definition.
Although it is true that the law as applied in courts does not ask jurors to contemplate the differences
between legal constructions, it is very possible and perhaps preferable for organizations to emphasize the
differences in perspectives in their antidiscrimination training protocols. Such an approach might help
workers take the perspective of potential victims when encountering possible wrongdoings against others
or even help them avoid engaging in misconduct themselves. One of the purposes of the current research
was to examine what effect enhancing a legal standard has on the judgments of those who apply the
standard to evaluate the behavior of others at work.
Regardless of the legal standard and therefore perspectives that the courts endorse in their cases,
employees in most organizations have multiple opportunities to evaluate gender-based interactions at
work from their own perspectives, the perspectives of objective others, and the perspectives of recipients
of the conduct. Furthermore, the behavioral tone of the recipients across these incidents may vary
extensively in degrees of aggression and assertiveness. In relating the complainant’s behavioral tone to
sexist attitudes, we reasoned that the aggressive behavioral tone of a complainant toward individuals other
than the alleged harasser might activate hostile sexism, and the submissive tone might activate benevolent
sexism. The result would be that these attitudes activated through the complainant’s behavioral tone could

carry over to influence hostile work environment judgments that workers make about subsequent events
and even subsequent complainants who are not tainted with the same aggressive or submissive behavioral
tones. The use of multiple cases allowed us to ask whether complainant behavioral tone effects are one
way to trigger hostile and benevolent sexism in worker judgments.
Indeed, prior research has shown that multiple exposures to social sexual conduct at work arouse attitudes
and beliefs about current and future cases (Maeder & Wiener, 2007; Wiener et al., 2004, 2005). Past
studies have shown that workers’ evaluations of harassment allegations depend on their experience with
prior allegations, the manner in which complainants interacted with others at work, the availability of
examples of harassment in memory, and individual differences in workers’ ratings of hostile work
environments (Maeder & Wiener, 2007; Wiener et al., 2002, 2004, 2005; Wiener & Hurt, 2000; Wiener &
Winter, 2007). Still, this issue remains unsettled in the empirical literature. Stockdale and her colleagues (
Stockdale, Berry, Schneider, & Cao, 2004; Stockdale, Visio, & Batra, 1999) argue and present data to
suggest that complainants who themselves experienced prior episodes of unwelcome social sexual
conduct as recipients of those actions are no more or less sensitive to its effects than those who evaluate
the conduct de novo. It is clear that there is a need for more research to determine when prior exposure to
misconduct either as an observer or as a victim influences workers’ perceptions of what constitutes
harassment in subsequent instances in their workplaces. This is important because it will allow us to
understand more about when and how cases arise in the workplace and how the law can inhibit or
facilitate the reporting of misconduct.
Although one might think that the issue of multiple exposures to diverse complainants is an obvious
factor to consider in harassment judgments, early research in sexual harassment has not addressed this
issue. Despite the high likelihood that workers come into contact with multiple complaints at work, most
researchers had participants read single vignettes with single complainants (e.g., Baker, Terpstra, &
Cutler, 1990; Burgess & Borgida, 1997; Gutek, Morasch, & Cohen, 1982; Gutek et al., 1999; Hartnett,
Robinson, & Singh, 1989; Jones, Remland, & Brunner, 1987; Kovera, McAuliff, & Hebert, 1999; Powell,
1986; Saal, Johnson, & Weber, 1989; Terpstra & Baker, 1986; Thomann & Wiener, 1987; ValentineFrench & Radtke, 1989; Wayne, Riordan, & Thomas, 2001). Participants evaluated the facts to determine
whether the complainants had or had not been the victims of sexual harassment. To be sure, not all
research looking at sexual harassment judgments presents single scenarios and asks for subjective
judgments. For example, Stockdale, O’Connor, Gutek, and Greer (2002) presented a short written
scenario, the same scenario accompanied by still photographs, and a 1 hr 20 min-broadcast video and
found few if any effects of prior experience with victimization on participants’ judgments of sexual
harassment. In later work, Stockdale et al. (2004) again modeled the comparative decision-making
process when they investigated the role of intra- and intergender status on judgments of sexual
harassment complaints made by men. Here, participants judged two different scenarios that manipulated
whether a male worker was the target of unwelcome sexual advances or the victim of vulgar and
derogatory name-calling. It is only with the use of multiple scenarios that we can begin to examine the
role of multiple exposures in psycholegal research paradigms.
To capture better the complexity of the work environment, Wiener and colleagues have conducted several
studies that employ multiple scenarios (Wiener & Hurt, 1997, 2000; Wiener et al., 1995, 1997, 2002).
However, the main purpose of these earlier investigations using multiple scenarios was to improve on the
generalizability of the legal standard, gender, and ambivalent sexism effects (benevolent and hostile sexist

attitudes). Still, Wiener and Winter (2007) found that male workers (but not female workers) who
observed a complainant with an aggressive or ambiguous behavioral tone drew weaker inferences of
harassment as compared with those who viewed a submissive complainant across two fact patterns. The
current study expands on the Wiener and Winter finding by disaggregating judgments across case
scenarios, studying the effects separately in each case example, and directly comparing the effects of the
manipulated behavioral tone of a complainant (aggressive vs. submissive vs. neutral) to measured hostile
and benevolent sexism.
Finally, it is important to take into consideration the gender of workers in understanding how employees
determine what does and does not constitute harassment. Most studies of sexual harassment judgments
report main effects and interaction effects involving sex of the observer, demonstrating that women
generally find more evidence of harassment than men do. However, there is some disagreement in the
literature on the importance of observer gender, with some arguing that gender effects are tenuous and
inconsistent (Blumenthal, 1998; Gutek et al., 1999). Nonetheless, the most recent meta-analysis has
shown that with ambiguous cases, women are more likely to find evidence of harassment as compared
with men (Rotundo, Nguyen, & Sackett, 2001). Following Wiener and Winter (2007) and Wiener et al.
(2004, 2005), each of which found that gender moderated the association of prior experience with sexual
harassment to judgments of misconduct, we included gender of the observer as a measured variable in the
current research, expecting that men would be more influenced by the behavioral tone of the complainant
than would women.
In summary, the purpose of the current study was to further our understanding of how the law and
workplace context interact to shape workers’ perceptions of hostile work environment harassment in two
ways. First, we investigated the effects of the behavioral tone (aggressive, submissive, or neutral) of a
harassment complainant on the judgments of workers about that complainant and about a second
complainant whose conduct was neutral in tone. Second, we compared the effects of manipulated
behavioral tone and measured hostile and benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996) on those judgments.
These considerations led to several hypotheses about how people evaluate social sexual conduct at work.
First, in accordance with prior research, we hypothesized that women would find more evidence of
harassment across both cases. Second, we predicted that workers exposed to aggressive complainants
would find less evidence of harassment because they would view those complainants as hostile and
therefore would see them as undeserving of relief, but that workers would find more evidence of
harassment with exposure to submissive complainants because they would view them as weak and in
need of protection. Third, we hypothesized an interaction between gender and complainant behavioral
tone, expecting women to be less sensitive to the behavioral tone manipulation than men would be
because the women would focus more on the facts of the case and less on the qualities of the complainant.
This is especially true when women are the victims of the harassment so that female observers identify
with the complainants and tend to see the workplace incidents from the complainants’ point of view.
Fourth, we expected that individuals high in hostile work environment harassment would find less
evidence of harassment and those high in benevolent sexism would find more evidence of hostile work
environment harassment. (Note that the literature reliably supports the first relationship and inconsistently
supports the second, sometimes even reporting the opposite effect for benevolent sexism.)

Fifth, we theorized that manipulated complainant tone (aggressive vs. submissive) would influence
judgments of harassment by activating hostile or benevolent sexism attitudes, respectively. That is, the
active ingredient in the effects of behavioral tone would be the triggering of sexist attitudes. As a result,
we hypothesized that individuals who were exposed to an aggressive (submissive) complainant in the
initial case would score higher on hostile (benevolent) sexism as measured on the Ambivalent Sexism
Inventory (ASI) administered after the workers evaluated the harassment cases and made hostile work
environment judgments. If behavioral tone activates forms of ambivalent sexism, then there should be
traces of that effect after workers use those attitudes to reach judgments about discrimination.
Furthermore, if manipulated behavioral tone and measured ambivalent sexist attitudes share a similar
psychological mechanism, then any moderating effects the legal standard might have on measured
attitudes ought to be similar for manipulated behavioral tone. In accordance with prior research ( Wiener
& Hurt, 2000), looking at a case from the victim’s point of view might cause both men and women to
focus on the facts of the case and ignore current or prior exposures to aggressive, submissive, or neutral
complainants. Therefore, the sixth prediction was that the effects of hostile sexism, benevolent sexism,
and manipulated behavioral tone would be strongest in the reasonable person standard condition and
weakest in the reasonable victim (here woman) standard condition. However, because the literature is
equivocal about the effectiveness of legal standards, we decided to experiment with bolstering or
enhancing the legal standards for some of the participants but not others. Some of the workers reflected
back on the standards just before completing the questionnaires that measured likelihood of sexual
harassment. We expected that those participants who reflected on the standard before using it would show
dampened effects for ambivalent sexism and for manipulated behavioral tone in the reasonable woman
condition but not in the reasonable person condition. That is, we predicted three-way interactions between
standard and enhancement with ambivalent sexism and with manipulated behavioral tone.
Finally, we anticipated that the activation of these attitude structures in one case should spill over into
judgments of a second, independent case. In other words, we theorized that presenting aggressive
(submissive) complainants in the first case would result in workers finding more (less) evidence of
harassment in a second unrelated case in which the complainant’s behavioral tone was neutral or
businesslike. This would especially be true if the effect of behavioral tone worked through activation of
sexist attitudes. Indeed, the effects of different types of complainants (i.e., aggressive, submissive, or
neutral) on judgments in an initial case spilling over into judgments in another independent sexual
harassment case would be evidence of assimilation, by which we mean constructs activated through an
initial task shape subsequent independent social judgments ( Blair & Banajia, 1996; Bargh, Chaiken, &
Govender, 1992; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis, Spears, & Postmes, 1998; Higgins,
Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Lepore & Brown, 1997). This carryover, possibly the result of psychological
assimilation explained by the activation of hostile and benevolent sexism, could have profound
implications for both the study of sexual harassment judgments and training in the workplace. That
finding would require researchers and trainers to conceptualize perceptions of sexual harassment as
dynamic and changing over time with exposures to complainants with different behavioral characteristics,
which in turn might activate sexist attitudes.
To test these hypotheses, we presented to participants two short DVDs that re-created the work
environments that two women workers had complained about in prior sexual harassment cases and asked

the workers to rate the claims of the women on dimensions of Title VII hostile work environment
harassment.

Method
Participants
We recruited 503 participants from the Lincoln and Omaha, Nebraska, metropolitan areas through
newspaper advertisements and community fliers distributed at local businesses. Respondents telephoned
the laboratory, and researchers screened them for eligibility and for level of hostile and benevolent sexism
using eight questions from the ASI (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Because the purpose of the study was to
examine the way the law influenced workers’ evaluations of multiple exposures to potentially offensive
social sexual conduct at work, eligible participants were full-time workers. Of the 496 participants who
provided complete demographic information when they arrived at the lab, 237 were men (48%), 259 were
women (52%), and 493 (99%) reported being employed full-time. (Note that seven of the total sample of
503 did not provide this information.) Four hundred twelve (83%) were European Americans, 35 (8%)
were African American, 20 (4%) were Hispanic, 6 (1%) were Asian, and 20 (4%) either did not report
their ethnic background or reported an ethnic background other than the ones indicated above. The sample
was reasonably well educated in that 222 (44%) had a bachelor’s degree or higher, 167 (33%) had
attended college but had not graduated, 81 had graduated from high school but had not attended college
(16%), and only 33 (7%) had not graduated from high school.
During the screening sessions, research respondents signed up for available sessions. Within each of
multiple 3-week blocks, we randomly assigned each of 24 scheduled sessions to one of the conditions in
the design. The design was a 3 (first complainant tone condition: aggressive vs. submissive vs. neutral) ×
2 (legal standard: reasonable person vs. reasonable woman) × 2 (enhanced reflection: enhancement vs. no
enhancement of the legal standard) × 2 (order of the cases: Reynolds first complainant and Farell second
vs. Farell first complainant and Reynolds second) between-subjects design. Between one and six workers
participated in each of the 24 sessions scheduled within each 3-week block.
Materials and Procedure
Cases. We hired a production crew and professional actors to reenact scripts that we modeled after the
fact patterns in two Title VII cases: Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998) and Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co. (1986) . We based the scripts on the events in both cases but modified the facts slightly in
the interests of efficiency, the need for experimental control, and the demands of the winter climate where
we made the DVD reenactments. The scripts and DVD reenactments displayed the events that took place
in the original cases with these modifications. That is, our research participants watched the events that
transpired in the cases as the actors played the scenes in the DVDs. In our Faragher case, Ms. Faragher
was a college student who worked part time as a lifeguard for a local indoor swimming pool rather than
for a city beach club. Ms. Faragher claimed that two of her supervisors created a hostile work
environment by repeatedly subjecting her and other female lifeguards to “uninvited and offensive
touching” and making lewd remarks, speaking about women in “offensive terms” (Faragher v. Boca
Raton, p. 780). Our reenacted DVD showed these actual events and remarks occurring at work similarly
to the way the case reporters had described them in the plaintiff’s complaints and employer’s responses.
In the second case, our Ms. Rabidue, an executive assistant, complained about a male coworker who

made crude and extremely vulgar comments about her and other women. The alleged perpetrator treated
women with little respect, often downplaying their abilities to complete their assignments successfully.
Ms. Rabidue claimed that some of the male employees displayed pictures of nude or scantily clad women
in the workplace. Again, our reenacted DVD showed these actual events and remarks occurring at work
similarly to the way the case reporters had described them in the plaintiff’s complaints and employer’s
responses. To minimize the unlikely possibility that participants would recognize the cases, we renamed
the scenarios. (The Faragher v. City of Boca Raton case became Farell v. City of Clearwater and the
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. case became Reynolds v. River City Refining Co.).
Manipulations. Participants watched both the Farell and Reynolds videotapes in counterbalanced order.
Thus, Farell was the first complainant case and Reynolds was the second case for half of the participants,
and Reynolds was the first complainant case and Farell was the second case for remaining participants. In
the first case, the actress portraying the complainant varied her tone to be aggressive, submissive, or
neutral (i.e., businesslike), whereas the actress in the second case was always neutral. We were interested
in whether we could activate hostile and benevolent attitudes toward complainants similar to the
measured individual differences in hostile and benevolent sexism captured by the ASI (Glick & Fiske,
1996). We intended for the showing of the aggressive (submissive) complainant in the first case to
activate hostile (benevolent) feelings toward the complainant in the second case. Each videotape ranged
from 23 to 25 min in length, followed by 3 min of legal definitions of sexual harassment.
After a brief introduction to the characters and the work environment, each first vignette presented one of
three opening scenes in which the complainant acted in an aggressive, submissive, or neutral tone. We
instructed the actors to play the scene differently according to the three experimental conditions.
Participants who saw the Reynolds video first viewed the opening scene(s) during which the complainant
acted in an aggressive, submissive, or neutral manner when she complained to her supervisor (not the
alleged harasser) about fellow workers who were not completing their jobs. The case presentation
manipulated the behavioral tone of the complainant through adaptations of the actor’s voice tone,
nonverbal behaviors, and emotional reactions. In the aggressive first complainant condition, the
complainant made belligerent demands, nearly shouting at her supervisor with a look of anger in her face.
The actress was told to portray an aggressive complainant. In the submissive first complainant condition,
the complainant could barely make eye contact. She looked at her feet and the floor as she sheepishly
reported her complaint, but in a muffled tone. The actress was told to portray a submissive complainant in
this scene. In the neutral first complainant condition, the complainant acted in a businesslike manner in
the opening scene, making moderate eye contact, speaking in a businesslike voice, and displaying a
typical workday expression. The actress was told to act as if it was a neutral, typical workday. We
intentionally chose to manipulate behavioral tone with a scene that involved a worker other than the
alleged harasser in both reenactments so that we could portray the alleged complainant as aggressive,
submissive, or neutral (i.e., businesslike) without also manipulating the conflict level with the alleged
harasser. Recognizing that the reaction of the complainant to the alleged harasser could contribute
additional aggressive or submissive information, we still chose to exclude the alleged harasser(s) in this
scene so as not to confound behavioral tone with conflict level in the victim’s reactions. To maintain
experimental control, all other scenes in the DVDs were identical so that we were able to hold conflict
level and victim reaction constant.

Similarly, participants who saw the Farell video first viewed the opening scene(s) during which the
complainant acted in an aggressive, submissive, or neutral manner when she greeted a fellow lifeguard
(again, not the alleged harasser) who was late relieving her at the conclusion of her shift. As with the
Reynolds’ first complainant case, the case presentation manipulated the behavioral tone of the
complainant through adaptations of the actor’s voice tone, nonverbal behaviors, and emotional reactions.
(Note that the actors were different in the two cases.) Participants in the Farell aggressive first
complainant condition watched a belligerent complainant and those in the Farell submissive first
complainant condition viewed a passive complainant. Finally, those in the neutral first complainant
condition saw the complainant behave in a businesslike, neutral manner. Manipulated behavioral tone in
the first scene was an independent variable in the research design.
At the conclusion of each video, a male and female narrator presented participants with legal definitions
and instructions to use to determine whether sexual harassment had occurred in the vignette. The
questionnaires also provided written instructions. Half of the participants received the reasonable person
standard, and the remaining participants received the reasonable woman standard. The narrators
explained that “hostile work environment sexual harassment results when an employee is subjected to
unwelcome sexual conduct, which a reasonable [ person/woman] would view as sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.” The narrators
elaborated, “The views of a reasonable [ person/woman] are those that an [ objective female] worker
would have in a similar environment under essentially like or similar conditions experienced by the
complaining employee.” 1 Finally, the narrators presented dictionary definitions of severe, pervasive, and
abusive. In this manner, we provided guidelines for evaluating hostile workplace harassment that required
participants to contemplate the criteria outlined in federal law. This language came directly from case law
and publications from the EEOC. Legal standard was the second independent variable.
After viewing the first case, which varied complainant tone, but before answering the main dependent
variable questions about the “severity or pervasiveness” test, workers in the enhanced reflection condition
answered two questions that asked them to think about the legal standard. The questionnaire began, “In
the video that you just saw, we asked you to take the perspective of a [reasonable person/reasonable
woman] to evaluate the facts in this case. Please think carefully about the [reasonable person/reasonable
woman] standard and write answers to the following questions in the space provided.” The questions were
(a) “In your own words, please describe what the [reasonable person/reasonable woman] standard means”
and (b) “How would a [reasonable person/reasonable woman] think about the case that you just saw?”
Those participants who were not in the enhanced reflection condition did not answer these questions;
instead, they went directly to the questionnaire that contained the “severity or pervasiveness” test for that
case. Standard enhancement occurred only once, after the video in the first case. There was no standard
enhancement manipulation for the second case. Enhancement of standard was the third independent
variable in the study.
Measures. Using 9-point Likert scales, all participants answered the following dependent measures for
the first case on the basis of the elements of the severity or pervasiveness test: whether the sexual conduct
was unwelcome, severity of the sexual conduct, pervasiveness of the sexual conduct, and the likelihood
that the plaintiff was subjected to hostile work environment sexual harassment. For the Reynolds case, a
factor analysis of the four elements of the severity or pervasiveness test (unwelcomeness, severity,
pervasiveness, and likelihood of harassment) produced one factor (eigenvalue = 3.06), with all factor

loadings at .85 or above. A four-item scale for hostile work environment harassment showed an internal
consistency reliability score of coefficient alpha equal to .90. The same analyses for the Farell measures
produced one factor (eigenvalue = 2.82), with all factor loadings .82 or above. A four-item scale for
hostile work environment for this case was also reliable (α = .86). This hostile work environment scale
constituted the main dependent variable for harassment judgments that participants made during the
study.
The questionnaire next asked participants to evaluate several behavioral attributes for the main characters
in the scenario on 9-point scales (e.g., 1 = not at all aggressive to 9 = very aggressive). The adjectives
that represented the behavioral attributes were aggressive, meek, competent, likeable, passive, forceful,
hostile, and kind. These items served as manipulation checks for the tone of the first complainant’s
conduct in the opening video scenes in the first case. 2
Next, participants answered 10 true–false questions that tested their knowledge about the events and facts
represented in the video for the appropriate case. These items, for which there were correct and incorrect
answers, served as checks to ensure that the participants had paid attention to the reenactments. Examples
of questions for the Farell case were (a) “Jim was always on time when relieving Suzanne Farell from her
shift” (False); (b) “Suzanne Farell waited a long to file a sexual harassment complaint” (True). Examples
of questions for the Reynolds case were (a) “Dorothy Simon, a friend of Kathy Reynolds, found Bob
Hayward a person with whom she could easily get along” (False); (b) “Some of the workers at River City
Refining Company enjoyed looking at a calendar with pictures of scantily dressed women” (True).
Participants next viewed the second video, during which the complainant always acted in a neutral
manner in the opening scene. Following this case, participants answered the same questions as they
answered for the first case but with the other complainant as the object of the Likert measures. There was
no enhanced reflection manipulation for the second case, so that the participants in the enhanced
reflection group answered those questions only once, when they encountered the legal standard in the first
case.
Next, participants completed the full ASI (Glick & Fiske, 1996), which measures hostile and benevolent
sexism with 22 self-report items for which respondents rate their agreement on 6-point Likert scales
ranging from 0 ( disagree strongly) to 5 ( agree strongly). Examples of hostile and benevolent sexism
items are, respectively, “Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist,” and “Women
should be cherished and protected by men.” Prior work by Glicke and Fiske (1996) demonstrated the ASI
to be a psychometrically sound instrument, and work by Wiener et al. (2000, 2004) and Wiener and
Winter (2007) demonstrated that the constructs work well in predicting judgments of sexual harassment.
In the current study, internal consistency scores for both hostile and benevolent sexism were more than
adequate (for hostile sexism, α = .83, n = 493, and for benevolent sexism, α = .84, n = 491).
The researchers also administered over the telephone during the screening session eight items from the
ASI to assess the participants’ level of hostile and benevolent sexism before they came to the lab and read
any study materials. Four of the eight items loaded high on the Hostile Sexism construct in prior research
that was unrelated to sexual harassment judgments (Glick & Fiske, 1996), and these four also correlated
with the full scale in studies of sexual harassment that administered the full inventory Wiener et al. (2000,
2004) and Wiener and Winter (2007). These items were “Women are too easily offended”; “Feminists are
not seeking for women to have more power than men” (reversed scored); “Once a woman gets a man to

commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight leash”; and “When women lose to men in a fair
competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against.” The other four items loaded
highly on Benevolent Sexism in the Glick and Fiske research and correlated with that measure in several
studies of sexual harassment that administered the full scale Wiener et al. (2000, 2004) and Wiener and
Winter (2007). These items were “Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores”; “A good woman
should be set on a pedestal by her man”; “Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well being in order
to provide financially for the women in their lives”; and “Women, as compared to men, tend to have a
more refined sense of culture and good taste.”
Factor analyses on the eight items in the current study produced two factors with eigenvalues greater than
1.00. The eigenvalue for the Hostile Sexism factor was 2.77, and with a cutoff score of .70, all four of the
first set of items loaded on this factor. The internal consistency reliability (coefficient alpha) for this
factor was .74 ( n = 495). The eigenvalue for the Benevolent Sexism factor was 1.56, and with a cutoff
score of .55, all four of the second set of items loaded on this factor. The internal consistency reliability
(coefficient alpha) for this factor was .68 ( n = 495). We aggregated the four hostile items to create a
hostile sexism screening measure and the four benevolent sexism items to create a benevolent sexism
screening measure. The hostile screen correlated significantly with the full hostile sexism scale that we
administered after the participants evaluated the scenarios, r = .53, p < .001, n = 491, and the benevolent
screen correlated significantly with the full benevolent sexism scale administered after the scenarios, r =
.68, p < .001, n = 491.

Results
Manipulation Checks
Case facts. First, with regard to true–false questions for all viewings of the Farell case regardless of
order, the 493 participants who completed the measure answered 9.5 of 10 questions correctly (95%; SD
= 0.77). With regard to all viewings of the Reynolds case, 495 participants answered 9.7 of 10 (97%) of
the questions correctly ( SD = 0.79). These data show that the participants paid close attention to the
videos and comprehended the facts that made up each of the cases.
Complainant tone in first-viewed videos. A complainant tone condition (aggressive vs. submissive vs.
neutral) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), which used only the data from the first viewing of
the Reynolds case after which workers rated the aggressiveness, submissiveness, competency, likeability,
passiveness, forcefulness, hostility, and kindness of Ms. Reynolds (when she was the complainant in the
priming case) produced a significant main effect, multivariate F(16, 484) = 11.13, p < .001, r = .52. Table
1 shows significant univariate F values for all eight adjective descriptors and post hoc tests using the
Newman–Kuels procedure. Participants in the aggressive as compared with the neutral complainant tone
condition found Ms. Reynolds more aggressive, forceful, and hostile, as well as less likeable and kind.
Furthermore, compared with those in the submissive condition, those in the aggressive condition found
the complainant more aggressive, forceful, and hostile, as well as less meek, likeable, passive, and kind.
Comparing the submissive complainant with the neutral tone condition, participants who watched a
submissive Ms. Reynolds found her kinder and more passive, but less aggressive, competent, and
forceful. As a pattern of results, Table 1 shows strong support for the success of the behavioral tone
manipulation in the Reynolds case.

For the Farell case, a prime condition (aggressive vs. submissive vs. neutral) MANOVA on the same
adjectives that participants rated for Reynolds also found evidence for a successful complainant tone
effect, multivariate F(16, 468) = 5.41, p < .001, r = .39. Table 1 shows significant effects with univariate
Fs for all but three of the measures (competence, likeable, and kind), none of which went directly to the
manipulation of aggressive versus submissive conduct. Applying the Newman–Kuels post hoc procedure,
Table 1 shows that those participants who observed the aggressive, as compared with the neutral, Ms.
Farell, found her more aggressive and hostile, whereas they found the submissive Ms. Farell less
aggressive, forceful, and hostile, as well as more meek and passive. Those who observed the submissive
Ms. Farell rated her, as compared with the neutral complainant, more meek and passive. Table 1 shows
support for the success of the complainant tone manipulation in the Farell case.
First Case Analysis
Analyzing ratings of the severity or pervasiveness test in the first case scenarios allowed the test of the
effects of case, complainant behavioral tone, legal standard, and enhanced standard for the actual
complainant who acted aggressively, submissively, or neutral in tone. As was the case in all prior sexual
harassment research, we added worker gender as a blocking variable, and to test the effects of hostile and
benevolent sexism, we added the screening measures for these variables (collected before participants
arrived at the laboratory) as continuous predictors to test their associations with judgments of sexual
harassment. We also tested the interactions of hostile and benevolent sexism screens with legal standard
and standard enhancement. Thus, the hostile work environment scale from each case served as dependent
measures in a 3 (complainant behavioral tone: aggressive vs. submissive vs. neutral) × 2 (legal standard:
reasonable person vs. reasonable woman) × 2 (enhanced reflection of standard: enhanced vs. unenhanced)
× 2 (gender) × 2 (case: Reynolds vs. Farell) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the first case viewed data.
The model tested all the main effects and interactions among these nominal level factors. The linear
model added the hostile and benevolent screening measures as continuous scales and tested for main
effects and interactions between these factors and legal standard and legal standard enhancement.
First, there was a main effect for the hostile sexism screening measure, F(1, 435) = 10.98, p < .01, r = –
.16, MSE = 2.20, 3 but it was qualified by an interaction between legal standard and the hostile sexism
screening factor, F(1, 435) = 3.42, p = .06, r = .09. Follow-up correlation analyses showed that the overall
correlation between the screening measure of hostile sexism and the hostile work environment scale was
negative, r = –.11, p < .05, n = 491. However, this association was significant only in the reasonable
person legal standard condition, r = –.22, p < .01, n = 241, and not in the reasonable woman factor
condition, r = –.01, ns, n = 250. Thus, workers high in hostile sexism found less evidence of harassment
across both cases, unless they evaluated the case from the perspective of a reasonable woman and not that
of a reasonable person. Furthermore, there was a significant gender effect, F(1, 435) = 8.85, p < .01, r =
.14, such that women ( M = 7.35) rated both cases higher on the harassment scale than did men ( M =
6.90). The gender effect replicated across both cases; however, there was a main effect for case effect,
F(1, 435) = 4.09, p < .05, r = .09, such that all workers found more evidence of harassment in the Farell
swimming pool case ( M = 7.27) than in the Reynolds office case ( M = 6.99) case. 4
With regard to the manipulated factors, there were no main effects. Instead, there was a two-way
interaction between complainant behavioral tone and gender, F(2, 435) = 3.42, p < .05, r = .12, and a
three-way interaction between gender, legal standard, and enhancement, F(1, 435) = 6.06, p < .05, r = .12.

Table 2 displays the means adjusted for covariates and follow-up tests of significance. For male but not
female workers, those who encountered the aggressive complainant found less evidence of harassment
than did those who encountered the submissive complainant. Furthermore, women found more evidence
of harassment than did men for both the aggressive and neutral complainants, but there were no gender
effects for the submissive complainant. Table 3 shows the means for the three-way interaction between
gender, legal standard, and enhancement. For male workers with enhanced standards (i.e., they reflected
and answered questions about the standards), the reasonable woman standard produced higher ratings on
the severity or pervasiveness scale than did the reasonable person standard. For women, there were no
effects of standard qualified by enhancement.
Second Case Analysis
Analyzing ratings of the severity or pervasiveness test in the second case scenario allowed a test of the
effects of case, first case complainant tone, legal standard, and enhanced standard for the complainant
who acted in a neutral tone in the second case. The second case was whichever scenario (Farell or
Reynolds) that each participant did not review in the first video, so that there were different fact patterns
and different complainants in the first and second DVDs. We performed the same analysis as we did for
the first case ratings, using the rating scale for hostile work environment harassment for the second case
as the dependent variable and the same control, covariate, and manipulated independent variables in the
model. However, here the effect of the first complainant legal tone was a carryover effect akin to a
priming inducement, such that we manipulated the aggressive or submissive tone of an earlier observed
complainant to test its effects on the evaluation of a subsequent neutral tone complainant. Finally, the
enhancement of standard occurred only at the time of the ratings of the first case, so that the participants
did not repeat this enhancement for the second case. However, the standard in the second case was the
same as it was in the first case for each participant. Therefore, we could test the effects of enhancement as
a carryover effect akin to training the standard in one case and testing its effects in a second different
case.
A gender effect emerged for the hostile work environment rating scale in the second case, F(1, 435) =
3.81, p = .05, r = .09, MSE = 2.70, 5 such that women ( M = 7.26) rated both cases higher on the
harassment scale than did men ( M = 6.93). Once more, the gender effect replicated across both cases;
however, there was also a main effect for case, F(1, 435) = 24.91, p < .01, r = .23, such that all workers
again found more evidence of harassment in the Farell swimming pool case ( M = 7.47) than in the
Reynolds office case ( M = 6.71).
Replicating the first case analysis, there were no main effects for the manipulated variables, but there
were several significant interactions. First, there were two significant three-way interactions involving the
ambivalent sexism screening scales; one between the hostile sexism screening scale, legal standard, and
enhancement, F(2, 435) = 3.02, p = .05, r = .12, and a similar one between the benevolent sexism
screening scale, legal standard, and enhancement F(2, 435) = 4.52, p < .05, r = .14. To follow up on these
interactions, we calculated partial correlations predicting the second case outcomes with both screening
measures (hostile and benevolent sexism) controlling for the other measure in each of the four Legal
Standard × Enhancement conditions. The only significant relationship to emerge was between benevolent
sexism and the harassment scale controlling for hostile sexism in the reasonable woman, unenhanced
condition, r = –.24, p < .01, n = 123. The simple correlation without controlling for hostile sexism was

also significant, r = –.22. In summary, under limited conditions, those scoring higher on benevolent
sexism found less evidence of harassment in the second case, but the association of hostile sexism and the
harassment scale found for the reasonable person standard in the first case largely dissipated in the second
case.
There was also a marginally significant interaction between the complainant’s behavioral tone in the first
case and worker gender, F(2, 435) = 2.82, p = .06, r = .25. Table 4 displays the means adjusted for
covariates and follow-up tests of significance. Women found more evidence of harassment than men did,
but only when they observed the complainant with the neutral behavioral tone in first case. There were no
effects for the first case behavioral tone for men in the Case 2 data; however, women primed with a
submissive complainant in the first case found less evidence of harassment relative to those in the
aggressive and neutral conditions. Apparently, women primed with a submissive complainant in one case
found a later complainant who was neutral in tone to be less likely the victim of hostile work environment
harassment. This effect resembles a victim-blaming phenomenon such that exposure to a submissive
complainant led women to hold subsequent complainants to a higher standard.
Finally, there was a three-way interaction between gender, legal standard, and enhancement on the second
case harassment scale, F(1, 435) = 4.77, p = .05, r = .10. Subsequent post hoc analysis conducted by
testing differences between means in each of the cells of the design resulted in only one significant
difference such that women judging the actions under the reasonable woman enhanced condition found
more evidence of harassment ( M = 7.60) than did men ( M = 6.71) in that condition. 6
Ambivalent Sexism as an Outcome
Analyzing ratings of the ASI, which workers made following their evaluation of the two case scenarios,
tested the effects of exposure to hostile work environment claims on hostile and benevolent sexism. We
reasoned that hostile sexism might decrease with exposure to a submissive complainant and that
benevolent sexism might decrease with exposure to an aggressive complainant or with use of a reasonable
person perspective. ANOVAs (3 × 2 × 2 × 2), in which the independent variables were complainant tone
in the first harassment case, legal standard, enhancement of the legal standard, and gender, tested these
hypotheses. Dependent variables were the full hostile sexism and benevolent sexism scales that
participants completed after viewing and analyzing the first and second cases. For hostile sexism, there
were two significant effects. First, there was a gender effect, F(1, 475) = 19.46, p < .01, r = .20, such that
men scored higher on hostile sexism even after evaluating two cases ( M = 2.07) than did women ( M =
1.72). 7 Second, there was a three-way interaction between behavioral tone of the first complainant, legal
standard, and enhancement, F(2, 435) = 4.63, p = .01, r = .14. Table 5 displays the means and follow-up
post hoc tests. Within the reasonable person legal standard conditions, those workers who viewed the
neutral complainant in the first scenario and evaluated her case with an enhanced standard showed the
highest level of subsequent hostile sexism, significantly greater than those who viewed a submissive
complainant under the same conditions. Those with the enhanced standard also scored significantly more
hostile than did those with the unenhanced reasonable person standard (both with neutral first case
complainants). Finally, under the neutral enhanced condition, those who used the reasonable woman
standard showed lower levels of hostile sexism. These data show that exposure to a submissive
complainant, under some conditions, can lower hostile sexism, but thinking carefully about that standard
in its reasonable person form increases hostile sexism.

The same analysis with benevolent sexism as the dependent variable resulted in a main effect for gender,
F(1, 475) = 101.46, p < .01, r = .42, with men showing higher scores on benevolent sexism ( M = 2.73)
than women ( M = 1.87) and a main effect for legal standard, F(1, 475) = 5.04, p < .05, r = .11. Those in
the reasonable woman condition scored higher on benevolent sexism ( M = 2.40) than did those in the
reasonable person condition ( M = 2.20). 8

Discussion
Summary of the Results
The purpose of the current study was to further our understanding of how the law interacts with
workplace context to shape workers’ perceptions of what constitutes hostile work environment
harassment. What did we learn? To begin, the data supported the first hypothesis showing that across both
cases women, as compared with men, found more evidence of hostile work environment harassment,
replicating our own prior work (Wiener & Hurt, 2000; Wiener & Winter, 2007) and supporting the
Rotundo et al. (2001) meta-analysis. However, the manipulation of the behavioral tone of the complainant
moderated the effects of gender, supporting the interaction that we proposed in our third hypothesis. It is
interesting that the effects of gender did not show up in the first case when the behavioral tone of the
complainant was submissive, that is, men found as much evidence of harassment as women when they
evaluated the submissive complainant but less when they evaluated a neutral or aggressive one. One
interpretation of this finding is that gender effects in prior research may have been the result of women
feeling the need to protect other women but men feeling that way only when the complainant presented
herself as especially needy of such protection. Because prior research has not manipulated the behavioral
tone of the complainant, the extent to which men see the protection needs of complainants probably varies
unsystematically with the case materials that researchers used in those experiments. This might explain
why gender effects are not always evident in studies of judgments of sexual harassment.
Although we found no main effects for complainant behavioral tone, thus disconfirming our second
hypothesis, we did find that when a complainant acts submissively as compared with aggressively, men
but not women find more evidence of harassment. Thus, men showed effects of behavioral tone that were
similar to prior findings in the literature for hostile sexism (O’Connor et al., 2004; Russell & Trigg, 2004;
Wiener et al., 2000, 2007). In those studies, decision makers found less evidence of harassment the more
they adhered to hostile attitudes and beliefs; in our study, men found less evidence of harassment when an
aggressive as opposed to a submissive complainant confronted them.
Partially supporting the fourth hypothesis, there was a main effect for preexisting hostile sexism in the
first case such that those scoring higher on our abridged screening measure of hostile sexism found less
evidence of sexual harassment. However, as in Wiener et al. (2000), this was true only for those using the
reasonable person standard. The effects of hostile sexism disappeared in the first case when participants
applied the reasonable woman’s standard and took the complainant’s point of view, and it attenuated in
the second case after decision makers had an opportunity to make decisions about the first complainant.
The reader will remember that half the participants evaluated the Farell fact pattern first and the other half
the Reynolds fact pattern first. Selection of the second fact pattern was random, determined by whichever
DVD the participant had not yet viewed. Therefore, because case was controlled by random assignment,

the fact that there was only an effect for hostile sexism in the first case demonstrated that practice making
decisions in the one case decreased the effects of hostile sexism in a later case. These interesting results
point to some ways to limit the role that hostile sexism plays in the workplace, in that these attitudes may
only affect judgments of initial exposures to social sexual conduct at work, and even then, they attenuate
when workers take the point of view of the female complainant. Repeated exposures to complainants and
taking the complainants’ perspective may be effective techniques to reduce the influence of these sexist
attitudes in discrimination contexts.
Prior work has shown stronger effects for hostile sexism than for benevolent sexism, and our work
supports this conclusion (O’Connor et al., 2004; Russell & Trigg, 2004). The only significant relationship
we found between benevolent sexism and judgments of harassment occurred in the second case and only
under the enhanced reasonable woman condition. Furthermore, that relationship was negative. Thus,
when workers in the second case applied a more subjective standard and had reflected on the meaning of
that standard, they found less evidence of hostile work environment harassment in a second evaluation if
they scored higher on benevolent sexism on the screening measure. Making matters more complex, men,
who found more evidence of harassment across both cases, scored higher on the full scale for hostile
sexism administered after the second case, which we would expect, but they also scored higher on
benevolent sexism. Thus, in our study as in others, the role of benevolent sexism in hostile work
environment judgments is tenuous and inconsistent. The more important attitude structure for
understanding judgments of hostile work environment harassment appears to be hostile sexism.
Nonetheless, there was some evidence that manipulated behavioral tone influences judgments in a manner
similar to hostile sexist attitudes, especially in initial exposures to workplace social sexual conduct, where
both increased hostile sexism under the reasonable person standard and exposure to an aggressive
complainant in men resulted in lower ratings of hostile work environment harassment. However,
benevolent sexism did not mirror the effects of the aggressive versus submissive complainant
manipulations, and it is not obvious why the similarity for hostile sexism and aggressive complainant tone
holds true for men and not women. Furthermore, although the reasonable woman standard did offset the
effects of measured prescreened hostile sexism, it was powerless to alter the difference in aggressive and
submissive behavioral tone effects in men. Thus, the impact of legal standard on the ambivalent sexism
was not at all the same as its influence on the manipulations of complainant behavioral tone.
Still, there may be some overlap between the priming effects of aggressive versus submissive
complainants and hostile sexism. Nonetheless, our data show that the relationship between these factors is
complex and likely involves other moderating and mediating variables. The partial support of our fifth
hypothesis that individuals exposed to an aggressive as compared with a submissive complainant in the
initial case would score higher on hostile sexism and lower on benevolent sexism as measured by the full
ASI warrants this conclusion. Exposure to a submissive complainant lowered hostile sexism scores, but
only for those participants who relied on the reasonable person condition and reflected on its meaning.
Consistent with other results, the behavioral tone manipulation had no effect at all on benevolent sexism
scores, but practice using the reasonable woman standard did increase workers’ scores on that factor. It is
not surprising that workers who took the female complainant’s point of view (twice) showed increases in
benevolent sexism. However, such an unintended side effect has limited negative consequence in
harassment judgments because benevolent sexism attitudes related only inconsistently and only under
very specified conditions to those judgments.

Furthermore, the disconfirmation of the sixth hypothesis that the effects of hostile sexism, benevolent
sexism, and manipulated behavioral tone would be strongest in the reasonable person standard condition
and weakest in the reasonable victim (here woman) standard condition shows substantial independence of
measures of ambivalent sexism and complainant priming effects. To be sure, we continued to find that the
effects of hostile sexism were only significant in Case 1 in the reasonable person condition, but such
moderating effects were not found for the complainant behavioral tone manipulation. In summary, there
were some interesting relationships between the outcomes of the manipulations of complainant behavioral
tone and the associations of ambivalent sexism with judgments of harassment, but overall our data show
that these constructs are not the same and seem to act through at least partially independent routes.
Nevertheless, the similarities between the measured and manipulated variables that emerged in this
research suggest that future work examining their separate and joint effects on workplace judgments
could be fruitful.
Perhaps the most interesting findings came out of our seventh hypothesis concerning the carryover effects
of the manipulations of behavioral tone of the first complainant and judgments of the second case with a
neutral and independent complainant. Although there was such an effect, it was different from the
predicted one. The carryover effect occurred only for women participants, and it took an unexpected
form. Women primed with a submissive complainant in the first case found a later complainant who
behaved in a neutral tone less likely to be the victim of hostile work environment harassment. One
interpretation of these findings is that when female observers confront another female worker who acts in
a submissive manner and then experiences a sexually hostile work environment, the observers develop a
tendency to blame that complainant and subsequent ones because the first complainant did not respond
assertively to the situation. Although additional data are necessary to examine this explanation, it is
possible that female observers believe that when other women are submissive at work, they bring these
discrimination problems on themselves. Furthermore, there is also evidence for victim blaming of
submissive complainants in the first case. In that case, women who viewed a neutral or aggressive
complainant found significantly more evidence of harassment than did men, but those exposed to a
submissive complainant did not find significantly more evidence of harassment than did their male
counterparts. This, too, is consistent with female workers blaming a submissive complainant for the
misconduct that she experiences.
Others have attributed victim blaming to a just world theory ( Lerner, 1980) in which observers attribute
responsibility to victims because they believe the world is a just place and those who experience negative
outcomes such as sexual harassment must deserve those outcomes. In this work, the victim might have
deserved it because she acted submissively and did not stand up for herself. Still others introduce the
defensive attribution hypothesis ( Shaver, 1970; Walster, 1966) to explain this phenomenon. Accordingly,
people believe that they are in control of their own conduct; therefore, when others receive negative
outcomes, it must be because of something that the actors themselves have done. This protects the
decision makers from believing that they will become victims of the same fate because they are in control
of their own behavior and would not act in a manner similar to the victim. Thus, female workers may
conclude that they would not act submissively and therefore they would not be subject to hostile work
environment harassment. Work by Maes (1994) with cancer patients showed that these two explanations
were separate and found evidence for both phenomena in victim blaming. Future research examining
discrimination judgments of female workers about other submissive complainants will certainly have a
great deal to add to both the applied and basic research in this area.

For the purposes of the current study, it is important to note that female complainants of sexual
harassment may be in a double bind. If they behave aggressively or even in a business-like manner, male
coworkers may be less sensitive to their complaints, but if they behave submissively, female coworkers
may blame them for being the victims of sexual harassment. This study did not intend to examine these
victim-blaming tendencies of female workers; therefore, we did not manipulate the second complainant’s
behavioral tone, but future research should do so to determine whether subsequent submissive
complainants suffer even more victim blaming from female coworkers than neutral complainants do. It
will also be important to learn whether male coworker observers find even less evidence of harassment
for subsequent aggressive complainants. Apparently, the behavioral tone of complainants interacts in
interesting but complicated ways in workers’ evaluations of social sexual conduct, and these effects do
not resemble straightforward priming effects as we originally anticipated. Instead, they seem to imply a
much stronger motivational component.
Training Implications
These results of this work, which presented aggressive, submissive, or neutral complainants of
harassment, showed that we were able to manipulate the way in which full-time workers apply the
severity or pervasiveness test to understand social sexual conduct that they might observe at work. While
prior research has shown that measured general hostility toward women is predictive of decreased
attributions of responsibility in allegations of harassment (O’Connor et al., 2004; Russell & Trigg, 2004;
Wiener et al., 2000, 2002, 2004), the current study shows that aggressive behavior of a single complainant
can cause the same effect for men. It also shows that presentation of a submissive complainant can
produce a similar effect in women, especially for judgments of subsequent complainants with whom
women come into contact. Although our work leaves open for future investigations the issue of whether
or not hostile attitudes triggered by aggressive complainants are the psychological mechanism responsible
for this effect, it does demonstrate that when people use the law to evaluate social sexual conduct, they go
beyond the facts that the law asks them to consider.
This is a result that the law does not condone and may not even anticipate. Even the broadest view of the
law would probably not include the complainant’s unrelated aggressive or submissive behavior as part of
the totality of the circumstances as the Supreme Court uses that concept (Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,
1993 ; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 1998 ). In other words, the law protects women from
workplace discrimination equally, regardless of whether they behave aggressively or submissively on the
job. The law does not recognize differences in complainant composure. Therefore, it is probably not the
best instrument to use to protect complainants from either the behavioral tone effects that likely result
from male workers’ expectations that women should not act aggressively or from the tendency of women
to blame submissive women for complaining about but not acting against hostile environments. Indeed,
given the inability of the law to counteract these influences, the task of debiasing men and women falls
directly on the human resources departments in organizations. Employee diversity training would do well
to teach workers to disregard such extra-legal factors as the complainant’s prior and largely irrelevant
behavioral tone when trying to sensitize those workers to recognize and report hostile work environment
harassment.
Policy Implications

What does our work have to say to Justice Alito’s concerns about the subjective versus objective
approach to evaluating hostile work environment harassment ( Burlington Northern v. White, 2006 )? To
begin, we did find an interesting, if unpredicted interaction between legal standard, enhanced standard
reflection, and observer gender in the first case. Table 3 shows that for men who reflected about the
meaning of the legal standard, those using the reasonable woman as opposed to the objective reasonable
person standard found more evidence of hostile work environment harassment in the first case. Therefore,
there is a possibility that the gender differences in which men find less evidence of harassment than do
women for female complainants could be reduced if the courts endorsed a more subjective standard,
especially if diversity training programs support the standard by training workers on the meaning of
taking the complainant’s point of view. However, the effects of enhancing the reasonable woman standard
were short lived. In the second case, which did not repeat the standard enhancement exercise, men who
had reflected on the reasonable woman standard in the first case and used that standard in the second case
found less evidence of harassment than did their female counterparts. One interpretation of these results is
that if the courts or legislators adopt a subjective standard, perhaps a reasonable victim standard may not
be sufficient to offset gender differences in hostile work environment cases. However, our results suggest
that adopting a subjective standard for the severity or pervasiveness test coupled with diversity training on
the meaning of that standard offers a promising possibility for equalizing the gender differences found in
hostile work environment cases. A conclusion regarding this possibility awaits a study that manipulates
standard enhancement in both a first and second case. Another important variable that we have not yet
included in this work is the timing of the standard. It may be that presenting the standard earlier, before
the workers observe social sexual misconduct, may have different and perhaps stronger effects than
presenting it at the time of the judgment. In fact, diversity training programs at work would likely include
training on legal standards well ahead of any exposure to potentially hostile conduct. Although the current
study did not test either of these factors (repetition and timing of the legal standard manipulation), we are
currently planning these investigations in our research labs in Nebraska. 9
Still, this work and other studies ( Wiener et al., 2002; Wiener & Hurt, 2000) show that in an incident of
first impression, the effects of hostile sexism in lowering judgments of hostile work environment
harassment are moderated when people apply a subjective standard. That is, whereas the judgments of
people applying the objective reasonable person standard show an association between elevated hostile
sexism and finding less evidence of harassment, the reasonable woman standard disrupts that association.
We advocate that courts and legislators take notice of this replicated effect before deciding on the best
approach to endorse in discrimination cases. The effects of the standard may be most important not for the
courts’ own decision-making process but instead for workers’ perception, evaluation, and understanding
of social sexual conduct at work.
Limitations
Admittedly, our use of simulations and samples of volunteer participants who have little at stake in the
experimental task, like much of the social science in this area, could limit our conclusions. Still, we recreated the video scenarios to resemble the fact patterns of realistic cases, and we did present the two sets
of materials to full-time workers who are likely to encounter the kinds of social sexual conduct that we
reenacted for them. Nonetheless, we would be more confident in our conclusions if they replicated in field
studies that asked real workers about their own experiences with social sexual conduct at work and that
used several different fact patterns. Furthermore, our work does not address directly the impact of prior

exposure to harassment incidents irrespective of the behavioral tone of the alleged victim. To do so, we
would have needed a control group of participants who had no exposure to prior harassment incidents. An
interesting and important factor to include along with that variation would be a self-report measure of
prior experience with harassment complaints. We are currently engaged in developing some of these
studies and hope to reinforce our early results with converging findings that speak directly to the impact
of any prior experience with harassment judgments. We invite other researchers to join us in moving this
work closer to capturing the totality of the circumstances embodied in the law as it interacts with the
totality of people’s experiences at work. The product of such sustained work will undoubtedly have
important implications for policymakers as they try to rid the workplace of illegal discrimination.

Footnotes
1

The full instructions and the full scripts are available from Richard L. Wiener.

2

Participants also answered the severity and pervasiveness test from their own perspective (the selfreferencing item). They were told, “Put yourself in the place of Suzanne Farell [Kathy Reynolds] and
respond to the following statements as if you were Suzanne Farell [Kathy Reynolds].” “If you had been
treated like Suzanne Farell [Kathy Reynolds], how likely is it that you would have been the victim of
hostile work environment sexual harassment?” These questions were not analyzed for this article. Similar
questions were asked for the Reynolds case, which were not analyzed either.

3

The MSE of 2.20 was the same for all the F tests for this linear model and is not repeated for the other F
tests with this model. Furthermore, the model produced a significant three-way interaction between legal
standard, enhancement, and case, F(1, 435) = 5.07, p <.05, r = .10, which we did not predict and which
did not qualify any of the other observed main effects or interactions.

4

Note that all means reported in this article are adjusted for the covariates in the linear model.

5

The MSE of 2.70 was the same for all the F tests for this linear model and is not repeated for the other F
tests with this model.

6

This analysis also produced a marginally significant interaction between legal standard and case, F(1,
435) = 3.70, p = .055, r = .09. Follow-up tests showed significantly stronger evidence of harassment in
both legal standard conditions for Farell as compared with Reynolds.

7

The MSE of 0.79 was the same for all the F tests for this linear model and is not repeated for the other F
tests with this model. The MSE for the benevolent sexism as dependent variable linear model was 0.91.

8

There was an interaction between the behavioral tone of the first complainant and whether or not the
workers participated in the standard enhancement exercise, F(2, 475) = 3.29, p = . 05, r = .12. However,
because this interaction did not involve the legal standard itself, it was not predicted and any
interpretation would be speculative at best.

9

We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer who pointed out the importance of the timing for future
research.

References
Baker, D. D., Terpstra, D. E., & Cutler, B. D. (1990). Perceptions of sexual harassment: A re-examination
of gender differences. Journal of Psychology, 124, 409–416.
Bargh, J. A., Chaiken, S., & Govender, R. (1992). The generality of the automatic attitude activation
effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 893–912.
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behavior: Direct effects of trait
construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71,
230–244.
Blair, I. V., & Banajia, M. (1996). Automatic and controlled processes in stereotype priming. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 1142–1163.
Blumenthal, J. A. (1998). The reasonable woman standard: A meta-analytic review of gender differences
in perceptions of sexual harassment. Law and Human Behavior, 22, 33–59.
Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F. 3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000).
Burgess, D., & Borgida, E. (1997). Refining sex-role spillover theory: The role of gender subtypes and
harasser attributions. Social Cognition, 15, 291–311.
Burlington Northern v. White, 364 F. 3d 789 (2006).
Clark County School District v. Breeden, 523 U.S. 268 (2001).
Dijksterhuis, A., Spears, R., & Postmes, T. (1998). Seeing one thing and doing another: Contrast effects
in automatic behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 862–871.
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F. 2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998).
Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F 3d. 1522 (1995).
Glicke, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1996). The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating hostile and
benevolent sexism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 491–512.
Gutek, B. A. (1985). Sex and the workplace: Impact of sexual behavior and harassment on women, men,
and organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Gutek, B. A., Morasch, B., & Cohen, A. G. (1982). Interpreting social–sexual behavior in a work setting.
Journal of Vocational Behavior, 22, 30–48.
Gutek, B. A., O’Connor, M. A., Melancon, R., Stockdale, M., Geer, T. M., & Done, R. S. (1999). Utility
of the reasonable woman legal standard in hostile environment sexual harassment cases: A multimethod, multi-study examination. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 5, 596–629.
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
Hartnett, J. J., Robinson, D., & Singh, B. (1989). Perceptions of males and females toward sexual
harassment and acquiescence. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 4, 291–298.
Higgins, E. T., Rholes, W. S., & Jones, C. R. (1977). Category accessibility and impression formation.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 54, 181–192.
Hurt, L. E., Wiener, R. L., Russell, B. L., & Mannen, R. K. (1999). Gender differences in evaluating
social-sexual conduct in the workplace. Behavioral Sciences and the Law, 17, 413–433.
Jones, E. E., Remland, M. S., & Brunner, C. C. (1987). Effects of employment relationship, response of
recipient, and sex of rater on perceptions of sexual harassment. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 65,
55–63.
Kovera, M. B., McAuliffe, B. D., & Hebert, K. S. (1999). Reasoning about scientific evidence: Effects of
juror gender and evidence quality on juror decisions in a hostile work environment case. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 84, 362–375.
Lepore, L., & Brown, R. (1997). Category and stereotype activation: Is prejudice inevitable? Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 275–287.
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion. New York: Plenum Press.
Maeder, E., &Wiener, R. L. (2007). Does a truck driver see what a nurse sees? The effects of occupation
type on perceptions of sexual harassment. Sex Roles, 56, 801–810.

Maes, J. (1994). Blaming the victim: Belief in control or belief in justice? Social Justice Research, 7, 69–
90.
Melton, G. B. (1988). The significance of law in the everyday lives of children and families. Georgia Law
Review, 22, 851–895.
Melton, G. B. (1990). Law, science, humanity: The normative foundation of social science in law. Law
and Human Behavior, 14, 315–332.
Melton, G. B., & Saks, M. J. (1985). The law as an instrument of socialization and social structure. In G.
B. Melton (Ed.), The law as a behavioral instrument: Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (pp.
235–277). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
O’Connor, M., Gutek, B. A., Stockdale, M., Geer, T. M., & Melancon, R. (2004). Explaining sexual
harassment judgments: Looking beyond gender of the rater. Law and Human Behavior, 28, 69–
95.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1999).
Powell, G. N. (1986). Effects or sex role identity and sex on definitions of sexual harassment. Sex Roles,
18, 405–417.
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F. 2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
Rotundo, M., Nguyen, D., & Sackett, P. (2001). A meta-analytic review of gender differences in
perceptions of sexual harassment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 914–922.
Russell, B. L., & Trigg, K. Y. (2004). Tolerance of sexual harassment: An examination of gender
differences, ambivalent sexism, social dominance, and gender roles. Sex Roles, 50, 565–573.
Saal, F. E., Johnson, C. B., & Weber, N. (1989). Friendly or sexy? It may depend on whom you ask.
Psychology of Women Quarterly, 13, 263–276.
Shaver, K. (1970). Defensive attribution effects of severity and relevance on the responsibility assigned
for an accident. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 14, 101–113.
Stockdale, M. S., Berry, C., Schneider, R. W., & Cao, F. (2004). Perceptions of the sexual harassment of
men. Psychology of Men & Masculinity, 5, 158–167.
Stockdale, M. S., O’Connor, M., Gutek, B. A., & Geer, T. (2002). The relationship between prior sexual
abuse and reactions to sexual harassment: Literature review and empirical study. Psychology,
Public Policy, and Law, 8, 64–95.
Stockdale, M. S., Visio, M., & Batra, L. (1999). The sexual harassment of men: Evidence for a broader
theory of sexual harassment and sex discrimination. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 5, 630–
664.
Terpstra, D. E., & Baker, D. D. (1986). A framework for the study of sexual harassment. Basic and
Applied Social Psychology, 7, 17–34.
Thomann, D. A., & Wiener, R. L. (1987). Physical and psychological causality as determinants of
culpability in sexual harassment cases. Sex Roles, 17, 573–591.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C. Sec. 2000c-(a)(1) (1964).
Valentine-French, S., & Radtke, H. L. (1989). Attributions of responsibility for an incident of sexual
harassment in a university setting. Sex Roles, 21, 545–555.
Walster, E. (1966). Assignment of responsibility for an accident. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 3, 73–79.
Wayne, J. H., Riordan, C. M., & Thomas, K. M. (2001). Is all sexual harassment viewed the same? Mock
juror decisions in same- and cross-gender cases. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 179–187.
Wiener, R. L. (1990). A psycholegal and empirical approach to the medical standard of care. Nebraska
Law Review, 69, 112–157.
Wiener, R. L. (1993). Social analytic jurisprudence and tort law: Social cognition goes to court. Saint
Louis University Law Journal, 37, 503–551.
Wiener, R. L., Hackney, A., Kadela, K., Rauch, S., Seib, H., Warren, L., & Hurt, L. E. (2002). The fit and
implementation of sexual harassment law to workplace evaluations. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 87, 747–764.

Wiener, R. L., & Hurt, L. E. (1997). Social sexual conduct at work: How do workers know when it is
harassment and when it is not? California Western Law Review, 34, 53–99.
Wiener, R. L., & Hurt, L. E. (1999). An interdisciplinary approach to understanding social sexual conduct
at work. In R. Wiener & B. Gutek (Eds.), Advances in sexual harassment research, theory, and
policy [Special issue]. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 5, 556–595.
Wiener, R. L., & Hurt, L. E. (2000). How do people evaluate social–sexual conduct: A psycholegal
model. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85, 75–85.
Wiener, R. L., Hurt, L. E., Russell, B. L., Mannen, R. K., & Gasper, C. (1997). Perceptions of sexual
harassment: The effects of gender, legal standard, and ambivalent sexism. Law and Human
Behavior, 21, 71–93.
Wiener, R. L., Voss, A. M., Winter, R. J., & Arnot, L. (2005). The more you see it, the more you know it:
Memory accessibility and sexual harassment judgments. Sex Roles, 53, 807–820.
Wiener, R. L., Watts, B. A., Goldkamp, K. H., & Gasper, C. (1995). Social analytic investigation of
hostile work environments: A test of the reasonable woman standard. Law and Human Behavior,
19, 263–281.
Wiener, R. L., & Winter, R. J. (2007). Totality of circumstances in sexual harassment decisions: A
decision-making model. In R. L. Wiener, B. H. Bornstein, R. Schopp, & S. Willborn (Eds.),
Social consciousness in legal decision making: Psychological perspectives (pp. 171–196). New
York: Springer.
Wiener, R. L., Winter, R., Rogers, M., & Arnot, L. (2004). The effects of prior workplace behavior on
subsequent sexual harassment judgments. Law and Human Behavior, 28, 47–67.

